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Karachi’s history has left a city riven by tribal, ethnic and sectarian divisions, which exhibits dimensions of 
fragility typical of ‘post-conflict’ cities. Pakistan has faced many challenges in establishing transparent 
government, and local government dissolution in 2009 led to a rapid increase in informal service provision, 
ghettoisation of low-income settlements, as sectarian violence left large parts of the city ungovernable.  
Through a case study of North Nazimabad, this paper explores the ensuing chasm and governance 
mechanisms that filled the gap, examining what happens when local government fails, and how groups and 











For the first time in 10 years in December 2015, Karachi voters went to the polls to elect representatives to 
the newly formed district corporations and union councils and committees. The elections, the first in 
Karachi’s history to be held under national democratic rule1, established the Karachi Metropolitan 
Corporation (KMC), the six districts of South, East, West, Central, Korangi, Malir and 247 union councils and 
committees2.  Karachi’s controversial Muhajir-dominated political party MQM (Mottahida Qaumi 
Movement) won a resounding victory holding 136 of the 247 union committees and councils3. Polling was 
marred by accusations of vote-rigging but security was tightly controlled by the Rangers’ paramilitary 
force4.  
The new local government is being reinstated after a long gap and chequered history.  Devolved local 
government was set up under the Local Government Ordinance, 2001 and parallel Sindh Local Government 
Ordinance, 2001, but dissolved in 2009 when a third round of elections were due. After 2009 problems 
reached their peak, and Karachi witnessed widespread informalisation of service provision, ghettoisation of 
low-income settlements, and a spate of killings and sectarian violence that left large parts of the city 
ungovernable.  A myriad of informal service providers – political parties, religious authorities, baradary, and 
tribal authorities – gained ground, dominating urban management, security control and the day-to-day 
running of many low-income settlements.  This arrangement came at a price – as ethnic-based political 
parties consolidated their territories, emerging leaders built a power base and coopted the remaining 
government funds for personal gain – with extortion and violence used to quell dissent, resulting in acute 
segmentation of neighbourhoods on ethnic lines.  The challenge for the newly elected district and union 
councils and committees is immense.   
This paper explores the process of informal governance that emerged during the interregnum 
between 2009 and 2015, and how socio-spatial segregation intensified as opposing groups claimed 
territory. The research is based on extensive fieldwork in 2014 in the neighbourhood of North Nazimabad, 
District Central, Karachi, and follow-up interviews in 2017.  North Nazimabad was selected following a 
systematic analysis of areas exhibiting different types of spatial segregation – political/ethnic; faith-based; 
ethnic, and socio-economic – as a complex area representing a range of divisions with a history of urban 
tensions and violence.  The area studied included both planned settlements, and informal settlements now 
mostly regularised through land titling though still informal in their management. 
The paper argues that the absence of the lower tier union-council government left a contested space 
into which many informal power-brokers and service providers emerged. Fieldwork draws on extended 
interviews with 53 people, including city-level professionals and civil servants to assess governance and 
security issues, and local-level community and religious experts, leaders and representatives to assess 
tensions over politics, space, ethnicity, and services. The focus was on informal urban management 
processes, particularly land controls, service supply and dispute resolution.  Work on the ground was 
challenging because of the security situation, and took place over several months with the knowledge and 
approval of local community leaders.   
The paper is structured in four parts.  In the first section, the literature review examines the debates 
on conflict-affected cities and their management. The second section explores the context of Karachi and 
its local government, and the third section examines the case study of North Nazimabad.  The concluding 
section, argues that the critical challenge for the new elected local governments will be addressing issues of 
security and equitable service delivery to Karachi’s complex neighbourhoods. 
 
Local government in fragile and conflict-affected settings  
The concept of ‘fragile states’ is widely debated. Whilst there is no internationally agreed definition, the 
terms 'fragile states' or 'fragility' generally refer to a fundamental failure of the state to maintain core 
services, e.g.: supporting security and the rule of law, and providing basic services and economic 
opportunity; fragile states are thus often characterised by ongoing violence, and insecurity, legacies of 
conflict, weak governance and inability to deliver equitable distribution of good and services5. The concept 
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of fragility is also used where states or institutions lack the capacity, accountability or legitimacy to mediate 
between citizen groups, making them vulnerable to civil conflict or every-day violence6. Fragility can result 
in a ‘parallel state’ with clandestine collaboration between political leaders, self-interested factions with 
government, and organised crime7. The OECD’s 2015 assessment of fragile states that included Pakistan, 
suggested five broad factors that help reduce fragility: reduction of violence; access to justice for all; 
accountable institutions; economic inclusion and stability, and resilience8.  
More recently the concept of fragility has been applied to cities, both as a reflection of state fragility, 
and the potential means for reconstruction and recovery.  Drawing on research in 15 cities, Beall et al. 
suggest that violent conflict has become increasingly urban, and distinguish between sovereign conflict 
involving international actors; civil conflict between organised groups one of which claims to represent the 
state, and civic conflict covering a range of violence including gang warfare, terrorism, riots, rebellions and 
other violent protests, ultimately ‘a reactive expression of grievance by urban populations vis-à-vis the state 
or other urban actors’9. Muggah describes the fragile city as a ‘discrete metropolitan unit’ whose 
governance is failing to deliver on the social contract, but also sees fragile cities as sources of local 
resistance and agency10.  
The fallout of rapid urbanization such as large informal settlements and persistent exclusion of 
specific groups and the urban poor often exacerbates civic conflict.  For example in Ahmedabad in Gujarat, 
the 2002 riots were the result of Hindu and Muslim tension in the city, but Hindu identity also became 
associated with the building of modern Gujarat11. Moser and McIlwaine12 argue that poverty, associated 
with unequal access to economic, political and social resources intersect to precipitate violence.  Although 
homicides are often taken as a headline indicator of violence, in practice urban dwellers often experience 
multiple forms of interconnected violence that become an everyday reality13.  
Access to land becomes a central element of the control exercised by political, social or economic 
elites, which heightens spatial segregation in conflict-affected cities as low-income communities are 
displaced from prime land. In 2009 Yiftachel put forward the concept of ‘gray space’, characterised by 
informal practices and delegitimising and criminalising discourse that create boundaries and divide urban 
groups, reflecting the expansion of dominant interests and exploitation of marginalised groups14.  In a later 
paper he identifies ‘property transaction’ as a form of spatial control excluding minority groups15. Similar 
methods have also been observed in Karachi, where use of violence has been reported as tool for excluding 
‘others’ from territory16, and property transactions are monitored by land agents and middle men17. 
Local governments are important in conflict-affected environments as a means of re-establishing the 
presence of the state and for demilitarising politics in divided communities.  Thus local government has a 
critical remit to respond to local needs, interact with local communities, and support economic 
development and service delivery, a role that is both political through the reconstruction of local polities 
and developmental in supporting social reintegration and economic recovery18. Brinkerhoff argues that 
reconstruction demands action across three domains: reconstituting legitimacy to expand participation, 
create accountability and combat corruption; re-establishing security to replace unaccountable, corrupt or 
subversive security forces, and rebuilding the effective provision of fundamental goods and services19. 
However, while effective local government can reduce the causes of conflict, ineffective local government 
can increase the risk of violence, particularly when dominated by elites or presiding over inequitable 
resource allocation20. 
Although Pakistan has not suffered from civil war or major upheaval, its experience of insecurity, 
weak governance, and social division bears many of the hallmarks of fragility.  Anten et al. suggest that 
governance in Pakistan takes place through a ‘complex web of alliances, loyalties and competing 
interests’21, and that bargaining takes place at all levels of government, federal, provincial and local.  
Provincial governments have sought to distribute favours to win support from local government, while local 
government is linked by loyalty obligations to tribal and feudal networks. In Pakistan, local leaders may be 
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selected from various tribal and ethnic groups, but shift political loyalty to command the highest price – 
those with more followers can bid higher and small groups continually lose out22.  
As cities expand, the structure, financial management and accessibility of the local state becomes 
increasingly critical to ensure access to basic services, environmental protection and basic security for the 
urban population. Karachi, with an urban agglomeration of around 20 million people23, has been 
particularly affected by some of the social and economic divisions endemic in the country.  Thus examining 
its history, and learning from the bottom-up processes of governance that emerge in the absence of lower-
tier administrative units, may create important pointers for future local government operations. 
 
Karachi‘s local government  
Karachi is a city of migrants, with politics often aligned with ethnic and religious identities24. Conflicts 
between political parties and religious groups have severely affected social life, leading to the emergence of 
ethnic and identity-based enclaves throughout the city, with resulting segregation that has added to safety 
issues and violence25.  Here the term ‘enclave’ is used to define socio-spatial units with an identity that 
contrasts with the surrounding area, rather an area of exclusive use. 
Since partition in 1947 there have been five waves of migration into the city reflected in the city’s 
ethno-political enclaves26. During partition in 1947 around 600,000 Muhajir Muslims from India arrived, 
more than doubling the city’s population27.  Newcomers were resented by the Sindhi population, but 
Muhajir leaders dominated city politics28. From 1960-1980, Punjabis and northern Pashtoons moved to 
Karachi, mostly to informal settlements around the SITE industrial area and the Orangi Hills.  The 1970-90s 
saw an influx of rural Sindhis moving to the city. The 1980s-1990 was the most turbulent period as Afghan 
migrants moved to Karachi following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and MQM gained political 
influence. During this period, Karachi’s role as a transit port for licit and illicit goods was intensified29. 
Finally, since 2000 in-migration intensified after the 2005 earthquake, 2010 flooding and Taliban insurgency 
in the North.  Over time each group established enclaves in the city, segregating areas and heightening 
conflicts during unrest and elections. 
Violence has become endemic with almost 18,500 homicides recorded between 2000 and 2015, an 
increase of nearly six-fold from a low of 471 in 2000, with a sharp escalation after 2009 to a peak of 2,789 
killings in 201330, and Karachi was ranked as one of the least liveable cities in the world31. The violence was 
mostly attributed to ethno-political and religious conflicts over territorial control and concentrated in 
lower-income areas of the city, although a focus on homicides misses the more hidden crimes for example 
extortion, theft and domestic violence, that are often underreported.  Political parties play an important 
part in segregation, the main tension being between MQM, which has been prominent at city level, and 
both the Pashtoon-dominated ANP32 and Baloch and Sindhi group, PAC, somewhat aligned to the PPP33.  
The establishment of local government in Pakistan has been highly political. During the colonial 
period, local governments were never substantively empowered, but had nominated members and 
extremely circumscribed powers – thus at the time of independence Pakistan had few developed systems 
of local government34.  Pakistan is now a federal republic with three tiers of government, federal, provincial 
and local35, and since independence in 1947 has experience intermittent periods of military and civilian 
rule. Local democracy was broadly nurtured under military rule, and replaced by unelected local structures 
run by civil servants during civilian rule. Up to 1999, the history of local government falls into four main 
periods36.  After independence the country inherited local bodies mostly run by government-appointed 
administrators. In 1958 under the first period of martial law ‘Basic Democracy’ reforms were introduced at 
all levels of government, with urban and rural councils indirectly elected through an electoral college.  In 
1971 under the imposition of ‘civilian martial law’, local bodies were dissolved and their functions 
transferred to official administrators.  From 1979 under the military rule of General Zia Ul-Haq, elected 
local government was introduced based on adult franchise. The Local Government Order, 1979, expanded 
local governments and empowered Deputy Commissioners37.  
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Following the coup in 1999 and under pressure from donors, particularly the World Bank, the military 
government introduced a radical decentralisation programme through the Devolution of Power Plan, 2001 
(DOPP), based on subsidiarity and the transfer of power from provinces to the local level38.  The ensuing 
Local Government Ordinance 2001 (LGO) removed the urban-rural divide and established 3-tier local 
government: district, town (tehsil/taluka), and union councils.  Districts were responsible for health, 
education, agriculture, etc.; towns for water, sanitation, roads, waste disposal etc., and union councils for 
monitoring service delivery and small development works.  In Karachi the act was implemented through the 
Sindh Local Government Ordinance 2001 (SLGO) which created the city district council, 18 Town Councils, 
and 178 Union Councils.   
At national level, the LGO created more than 6,000 councils in the country and established several 
fora for strengthening citizen involvement, including and District Monitoring Committees and Citizen 
Community Boards to improve service delivery through local participation and voluntary and self-help 
initiatives. The voting age was reduced from 21 to 18 to involve young people, and 33% of seats were 
reserved for women at all tiers. The district chief executive office and police superintendent reported to an 
elected mayor. Two local government elections were held in 2001 and 2005.  
After general elections in 2008, when a PPP-led government came to power at both federal level and 
in Sindh province, local government’s protection under the 17th Constitutional Amendment expired. Tense 
national politics meant that local government elections were deferred, the federal Ministry of Local 
Government was abolished in favour of provincial administration, and the advisory bureau was disbanded, 
effectively dismantling the DOPP39.  In Karachi, in 2009, the powers were transferred to the Commissioner-
led Karachi Metropolitan Corporation, the five pre-2001 Districts were reinstated, and 18 Towns retained as 
administrative sub-divisions. Town offices remained as woefully under-funded administrations run by KMC, 
and union councils were abolished.  
In April 2010, the 18th Constitutional Amendment ushered in a new era, which again devolved federal 
powers to provinces. Local government is protected under Articles 32 and 140(A) of the constitution, which 
made elected local government mandatory, but devolution was contested40. Provincial leaders were 
reluctant to pass local government laws preferring the old commissioner-led system, but unprecedented 
urbanization, a growing civil society lobby, and critical court decisions made it impossible for provincial 
governments to further delay local elections41. Pakistan’s four provinces have now all passed local 
government laws, and in Karachi the Sind Local Government Act, 2013, set up the Karachi Metropolitan 
Corporation, in urban areas district municipal corporations and union committees, and in rural areas, 
district and union councils.   
All the acts devolve key service delivery functions to local governments, with some exceptions, 
notably the revenue-earning Karachi Water & Sewage Board and Sindh Building Control Authority. In Sindh 
KMC, controlled by MQM, was largely stripped of influence and large areas of the city remained outside 
KMC control, including large cantonment and defence areas. Union councils are authorised to facilitate 
dispute resolution42. Meanwhile, unplanned settlement continued apace, both on the urban periphery and 
on marginalised urban land, and complex land markets emerged in which state and non-state players vie to 
control land and engage with different layers of the state43. These are less a problem of land scarcity but of 
procedures that disadvantage the poor – challenged through community-led actions such as the Orangi 
Pilot Project, which borders North Nazimabad.   
In 2011, the deteriorating safety and security in Karachi led to a suo moto notice by the Supreme 
Court of Pakistan, which blamed political militants, sectarian organisations and crime syndicates for the 
lawlessness in Karachi44. The court directed the government to take action.  Thus, in 2013, the federal 
government, through the interior ministry, launched the Karachi Operation, operated by the police and the 
Rangers (a provincial paramilitary force) to ‘root out criminals and terrorists’45.  After initial results, police 
performance declined and the core police team was dismantled, although the Rangers continued the 
Operation46. By 2014 and 2015 crime levels were falling, but allegations of violence and extra-judicial 
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killings by the security forces had started to emerge47, and it is unclear whether the Karachi Operation 
stabilised unrest or led to further violence that undermined local government and police authority. Since 
2013, while petty crime has slightly increased, homicides have fallen from 2,789 in 2013 to 343 in 201648. 
Pakistan is considered to be a transitional democracy with teething problems for the evolving 
federation, and complex relations between global, federal, provincial and local government. A critical 
problem has been that, as subsequent military regimes promoted local government while retaining 
centralised control at federal level, local government came to be identified with military rule49. The 2001 
devolution process missed the opportunity to integrate traditional structures into local government50. 
While each period of military rule introduced its own type of grassroots democracy, under the LGO 2001 
substantial progress was made towards effective decentralisation and democratic local government51. 
However, even under the LGO, local power brokers often with tacit support from state institutions had 
hijacked the new institutions and local elections could easily be rigged52. After 2009 the lack of lower-tier 
union councils, and poorly resourced districts left significant gaps in local administration as the North 
Nazimabad case study shows. Unrest has been on-going, with violence endemic, although as Gayer argues, 
such conflicts never cross the line to become a city level civil war, highlighting presence of ‘regulatory 
mechanisms’ that maintain order within the visible disorder53. 
 
Managing North Nazimabad 
An area in North Nazimabad was chosen for study because of the range of ethnic enclaves it exhibits. It is 
one of the 18 towns in District Central established under the SLGO, 2001, which stretches for about 1.8 
kilometres along Shahrah-e-Noorjahan Road (SNJ Road).  To the west is the steep divide of the Orangi Hills, 
and to the north the dramatic Kati Pahari Road, built in 2009 through a cutting through the hills to connect 
North Nazimabad to Orangi.  There is an acute physical divide between areas formally laid out in the 1953 
Planning Scheme and informal areas – land invasions that climb up the steep slopes of the Orangi Hill 
(Figure 1).  Unless otherwise attributed, all the information in this section comes from key informant 
interviews.   
 
 
Figure 1: North Nazimabad: location in District Central               Figure 2: Ethno-religious enclaves in North Nazimabad 
Source: base map Google, 2014, analysis author                Source: base map Google, 2014, analysis author 
 
The informal areas were originally squatted, and although now mostly titled and no longer 
technically informal, they remain distinct in many ways. The formal area has remained peaceful, but the 
western zone on the boundary with Orangi Town has been the focus of Pashtoon-Muhajir conflicts since 
the mid-1980s, as it forms a border between Muhajir and Pashtoon strongholds54. The violence increased 
during 2007-2013, especially after the new road opened, and the Kati Pahari area is now one of the most 
violent flashpoints in the city55. During 2011-2012, SNJ Road Police Station registered 35 political killings, 
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and Taimuria Police Station registered 2856. Most of the violence has been around ethno-political conflicts, 
but street crimes and rent seeking of all sorts are widespread. 
The area has a population of about 195,00057, and within both formal and informal areas there are 
several distinct localities marked by tribal and religious affiliations (Figure 2). The informal area is mostly 
occupied by Pashtoon communities, with distinct neighbourhoods including Umer Farooq Colony settled by 
Balti, Kohistani and Hasan Zai Pashtoon communities; Deer Colony occupied by Pashtoons from Deer 
District in NW Pakistan, and Pahar Gunj occupied by Punjabi Christians.  In the formal areas there are Bohri 
and Ismaili neighbourhoods, with other areas mainly occupied by people of Muhajir descent.  Politically the 
area has always been divided, with the formal areas largely supporting MQM and the informal areas ANP 
strongholds, although ANP has lost ground since 2013 when Pakistani Taliban started attacking ANP offices 
and representatives. Other strong affiliations are with Jamat-e-Islami, another rival party to MQM. 
However, irrespective of political affiliation, ethnic identity plays a vital role in politics.  
Under the old LGO 2001, local government poured unprecedented development funds into the city, 
particularly into MQM constituencies, which were mostly in formally developed areas. The former union 
councils were funded by grants from district councils and local tax collection, and were run by a directly 
elected mayor (union nazim) and deputy mayor (naib nazim) (who automatically became members of the 
City District Councils) and four elected councillors58. They were supported by a small staff in local offices, 
serving about 40,000-50,000 people. More importantly they were local and accessible.  Many interviewees 
said that, after the 2009 abolition of the local tier they felt alienated from city administrators and the 
elected provincial and national legislative assembly members, who rarely visited the areas because of 
opposition politics or security threats, and that the union council and elected local government system was 
much better.   
To examine the gap left by disbanding the union councils, the fieldwork looked at five dimensions of 
governance: leadership and power groups, security provision, dispute resolution, services, and land control, 
examined in more detail below.  
 
Leadership and power groups 
It is widely recognised that ethnicity and politics in Karachi are closely intertwined, as vividly 
illustrated in the quote from Yusuf below.  
Historically, Karachi’s ethno-political violence has pitted Urdu-speaking Muhajirs of the MQM against 
Pashtoons represented by the ANP, but clashes between the rural, Sindh-based PPP and Karachi-centric MQM 
are increasing as part of a broader power struggle between the city and provincial governments.  ... The armed 
wings of major political parties, including the MQM, PPP, and ANP, are the main perpetrators of urban 
violence59.  
Ethno-political divides were also reported in the interviews for this research, summarised in the 
sections below. Traditionally, MQM dominated Karachi’s municipal politics, but with successive migrations 
into the city, ANP emerged as a major political player with some areas so tightly controlled by political 
vigilante groups that they are ‘no-go-areas’ for the police and security forces. Competition between parties 
is acute, with conflict over control of public-sector resources, including jobs, health, education and services.  
In North Nazimabad, political affiliation followed the dividing line between formal and informal areas; in 
the formal area, ‘street control’ rested with MQM, while in the informal areas ANP had traditionally held 
sway  although in the 2013 general election the new PTI (Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf) won votes. The PPP 
(Pakistan People’s Party) which dominated the provincial government was not widely represented in North 
Nazimabad60.  After 2009, four main types of power groupings emerged.    
Political parties retained their hold with active political offices and workers but were often affiliated 
with religious and secular groups.  Establishing ‘turf’ is an important part of political control, which can 
include organising rallies and political gatherings, wall-chalking and flag-flying, the operation of vigilante 
groups and threats of violence. Billions of rupees are earned through various forms of rent-seeking, mainly 
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by criminals affiliated to political parties, who win votes but also earn impunity from local power 
hierarchies and the state. ‘Extortion’ from businesses, demanding protection money, or cooption of funds 
for service delivery is common.  In 2012 Baldia Town in District West, more than 250 textile workers died 
when a factory was burnt down, reportedly because an owner refused to pay extortion demands61.   
Cultural and tribal governance systems are important in the Pashtoon-dominated informal areas, 
operating as an extension to political parties, except in Christian-dominated Pahar Gunj. One leader in the 
informal area was a former union council nazim, renting property to the union council for their offices.  
After 2009, he continued to occupy the property, and run the locality as before, raising private ‘taxes’ to 
cover costs.  Loyalties are deeply engrained as one interviewee indicated: 
MQM has carried out so many atrocities on (Kohistani) Pashtoon communities that even if they dug a canal of 
milk for us here, they cannot win our hearts. Many young men have been killed in the city, just because they 
were Pashtoons (informal area resident).   
The baradary – family, tribal or kinship networks, widespread in rural Pakistan – have flourished in 
ethnically-dominated urban localities. Baradary is a brotherhood of people linked through tribe or kinship, 
supervised by community elders that organize the community, and solve problems and conflicts according 
to unwritten social rules. Each baradary is headed by a resourceful, knowledgeable and widely-accepted 
elder, sometimes a hereditary leader or a person of social standing and ability.  Pashtoon baradary are 
defined by their tribes and places of origin, such as the Hasan Zai Tribe, Afridi Tribe, Pashtoons from Deer 
and Pashtoons from Kohistan, and together they form a larger baradary.  Political relations are subservient 
to the baradary system to the extent that political leaders have to be community elders or leaders to stand 
for election. 
Religious power-structures also predominate amongst some communities.  The Punjabi-Christians 
are grouped into four main clans, each with tribal elders who look after community affairs. Social life is 
centered around the church, the pastor is appointed centrally, and they also operate a baradary system. 
The Balti-Shia are organised by the prayer leader at the local Imam Bargah, or congregation hall, supported 
by community elders. The Gujarati-Bohri community has a centralised administration based in Surat, India, 
and the local Jamatkhana (place of gathering) is run by local religious leaders.  The Gujarati-Ismaili have a 
strong institutional fabric linked to the Aga Khan’s leadership.   
In the formal areas, many interviewees confirmed that residents of these areas often try to avoid 
active involvement in political parties, even where there are strong ethno-religious groups, e.g. amongst 
the Bohri’s and Ismailis.  However where there is no other local leadership and to protect their interests 
residents tend to form neighbourhood committees.  Such committees focus on security, setting up and 
manning road blocks and gates, and lobby when there is a breakdown in service provision, but do not 
challenge the political parties and their controls. 
The importance of these controls can only be fully understood in contrast to areas without such 
structures. In the north of the study area there is a locality that was segregated from its former union 
council area after the construction of the Kati Pahari Road. Political leaders from the former council no 
longer had an interest in this settlement. A drug gang temporarily emerged, but the gap re-emerged once 
the drug gang was curtailed.  As one interviewee said, 
Since this area was controlled by famous drug gangs, people try to avoid coming here.  There was a 
committee developed by Afridi people who were also asked by the locals to sit here and look into 
matters, but that did not work out… and few political parties take an interest in the area (informal area 
resident).  
 Thus, power groups bring various benefits, including services, tenure regularisation, security and 
stability to areas experiencing inefficient local government and service provision. However, such service 






In general policing did not reach most of North Nazimabad, especially internal streets and the informal 
areas, and security was provided by vigilante gangs affiliated to local leaders. The prevalence of illegal 
weapons, increase of crime and drug gangs, and the initial ineffectiveness of the Karachi Operation, a 
military operation started in 2013 with the aim of reducing crime in the city, were also blamed on weak 
security services. Throughout North Nazimabad in both formal and informal areas residents had erected 
gates and barriers to restrict pedestrian and vehicle movement, manned by private security guards.   
 The presence of the Rangers also complicated the security provision.  Rangers are an elite 
paramilitary security force operating throughout Pakistan.  An office block for the forces and government 
housing for Rangers and their families is located in the formal area of North Nazimabad. The Rangers’ 
headquarters and offices had been attacked several times and the residential complex threatened, so that 
many roads in the vicinity had been closed. Rangers’ patrols restricted parking in the area, particularly near 
Pahar Gunj Roundabout, in order to avoid terrorist attacks, but this badly affected the car mechanics’ 
businesses in the area.  A resident of the formal area said that the Rangers put up a guard post near his 
house and restricted car parking nearby, but when he complained he was told to ‘just follow the orders’, 
otherwise he might vanish.  Interviewees reported that the dead bodies of missing people were routinely 
found on the roadside. 
 
Dispute resolution 
The jirga is a traditional decision-making assembly of leaders and is widespread amongst Pashtoon 
communities in North Nazimabad, particularly in the informal areas. Under the jirga system community 
elders sit together to reach consensus about general community problems, contract enforcement, or an 
individual’s issues. Each community has their own dera/baithak (guest /community area) where elders 
gather regularly to meet residents. The verdict of a jirga becomes the binding on all parties in a dispute. The 
relevant parties – community or individuals, are responsible for the food and other needs of the jirga.   
Amongst other communities, a two-layered governance and dispute-resolution system exists, 
consisting of the religious authorities, and then the community through the community leaders. Political 
parties resolved some disputes, but in addition, there were some groups with a narrow influence, such as 
Punjabi-Barelvi Muslims in Pahar Gunj and the Shia families in the formal areas. The Punjabi-Christians of 
Pahar Gunj were distinct, from their appearance, language and the freedoms given to women; as non-
Muslims they had different customs and were allowed to consume alcohol, but were looked down on 
because they were traditionally bhangi (sweepers and sanitary workers) which is linked to the Hindu 
scheduled-caste and is a derogatory term. Thus Punjabi-Christians were a relatively weak community, 
despite having around 5,000 voters, and moving into diverse professions. 
 
Services 
There are significant differences in service provision across North Nazimabad. Although trunk infrastructure 
is available, in both administrative and physical terms services are poor or non-existent in some localities 
and the infrastructure is not maintained or serviced. After 2009, the union committee functions of solid 
waste management, cleansing and infrastructure maintenance were transferred to various state agencies: 
KMC (Karachi Municipal Corporation) was responsible for solid waste management, cleaning and 
maintenance of infrastructure, KWSB (Karachi Water and Sewerage Board) for sewerage and water supply 
and K.E (Karachi Electric) for the electricity supply and SSGC (Sui Southern Gas Company) for the gas fuel.  
Under the 2013 system, only cleaning and infrastructure maintenance has been returned to the union 
committees, and many other functions have been transferred to the provincial government. 
The interviewees revealed a huge gap in KMC services. Service provision was not a complete failure, 
as it worked when there was influence from powerful actors, political parties or individuals. In the informal 
areas, during the first period of elected local government from 2001-2005, services were reasonable as the 
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nazims had enough staff to service the area properly, but since then, the service has declined except in the 
area of Rangers’ family housing, which is relatively secure and well-serviced. 
 In the informal areas, especially on the hill, the electricity company representatives did not repair 
faults or disconnect illegal connections because of the difficult terrain and threats to company employees. 
Thus, most residents on the hill had illegal electricity connections and did not pay their bills. To recover the 
















Figures 3: Winding street pattern and illicit water and electricity connections in Chamra Chum, North Nazimabad  
 
In the informal areas, water shortages were acute. Supply was provided every 16-18 days, and each 
settlement gots water for only 2-3 hours on supply days. The residents on the upper slopes were worst hit 
as, although the water pipelines existed and the pumping station was working, there was insufficient 
pressure to reach the top, so people used two or three suction pumps along a pipeline to get the water.  
There are various reasons for failure.  First, the main Karachi water reservoir, the Hub Dam, ran out of 
water in 2014 due to a relatively dry season, but the formal areas in North Nazimabad continued to receive 
water. Second, supplies were diminished by illegal water hydrants established by the water-tanker cartels 
in adjacent areas; the water tankers then sell the water to residents. Finally, many community leaders also 
owned illegal hydrants, and also operated water tanker services.  The only neighbourhood in the informal 
areas to get regular water was Deer Colony, because of the effectiveness of its leadership. 
Several attempts have been made to address the issue. Previously, there was no mechanism for 
distributing water during a shortage, and the valve operators had to be bribed to get the water to the 
settlement, as there are 64 valves in the informal area. This led to many conflicts so the elders decided to 
set up a water management committee to oversee the distribution. The committee included the 
community representatives and the illegal hydrant owners. By 2014, supplies had improved, especially for 
those who lived at the bottom of the supply line. Some leaders invested in water wells, and sold water to 
their communities, for example in Hasan Zai, Kohistani and the Balti neighbourhood. The Imam Bargah 
(congregation hall) in the Balti neighbourhood built an underground water storage tank, supplied by water 




Informal land controls are one of the defining characteristics of the study area, and took place through a 
number of mechanisms.   
Access control was operated through a series of barriers, gates and guardposts, which restricted 
through traffic and access by strangers, and served to control both crime and political activism by 
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opposition forces.  Barriers mostly affected vehicles but also showed pedestrians that they were entering 
an observed area.  Most of the baradary-led areas did not have barriers but used social signals as 
mechanisms of control.  In the informal areas the narrow and steep streets meant that security forces could 
not use vehicles, so these areas had become a hiding place for criminals who were concealed by the 
community if they were kinsmen. 
… there are all kinds of criminals on the hill,, just because no one goes up there. Police and Rangers 
don’t go there, so these have become safe sanctuaries criminals …. no-go-areas (informal area 
resident). 
However, residents of these areas could also avoid paying electricity and water bills.  Access was a 
controlled through both organised and informal surveillance, by setting up watch-and-ward systems often 
operated by political workers, or by questioning outsiders or passing information to leaders. Flags, graffiti 
and wall-chalking were also used to identify and demarcate the boundary of political or other territories. 
 Property control was another means through which power groups consolidate territory, through 
tactics which tend to heighten ethnic segregation.  Occupants from different sects or opposing parties 
could be intimidated and forced to move.  Near religious buildings, the community controlled rental 
property. Pashtoon leaders were often explicitly involved in property contracts, while some of the richer 
communities bought up property at higher-than market rates.  Deer Colony under tribal leadership in the 
informal area had strong land-use controls, with a defined boundary marked by a controlled entrance and 
check post, designed to reduce crime and bolster identity. These rules restricted bachelor housing; banned 
tea-houses and hotels; imposed informal property-transaction taxes to fund the mosque; imposed 
sanctions through community elders, and decided the voting choice of the community.  
Land invasions were also common particularly on the hill. China cutting refers to the illegal 
encroachment of amenity plots, parks and playgrounds, which were then sold or developed for apartments 
to political followers, with ‘thugs’ (vigilantes) protecting contracts. This practice peaked during the 2005-
2009 local government term. One interviewee reported that a new apartment block had been built with a 
bullet-proof wall facing the adjoining opposition stronghold. 
 Rent-seeking was also common, with extortion in the name of political parties or criminals 
masquerading as Taliban supporters.  Sometimes the extortion was aggressive and came via a phone call or 
letter.  One resident reported that his extortionist included a Rs.500 note to buy a coffin if the demand was 
not met. Some demands asked for a cut of property or other transactions, while others requested goods as 
‘welfare’ or ‘religious’ donations, for example the valuable hides of animals slaughtered during the Eid 
festivals. Public funds were pilfered – for example residents were charged for a new water pipeline which 
was laid over an existing, functioning one. 
 
Crossing the chasm   
Pakistan has faced many challenges in establishing modern and transparent government over recent 
decades, and while it cannot be described as ‘post-conflict’, it nevertheless shares many dimensions of 
fragility identified in the literature.  The fortunes of local government have varied – local democracy has 
broadly thrived under martial law and waned under civilian rule, so in popular perception local government 
has become identified with military regimes. 
The migrant city of Karachi, with its diverse ethnic and religious communities, has struggled for many 
years to reconcile the deep-seated rivalry between the MQM-dominated city and PPP-led provincial 
government, and new political players now emerging. Effective local government has in part been a 
casualty of this contest, as ethnic tensions have descended into civil conflict.  The introduction of devolved 
local government under the SLGO 2001 and massive development spending led to a period of stability, 
although the dominance of MQM at local and briefly at provincial level led to resentment amongst other 
groups in the city. Politically-motivated violence started to emerge around 2005, but escalated rapidly after 
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local government dissolution in 2009 until around 2013, although a self-regulating social balance meant 
that conflicts never became full-blown civil war. 
In North Nazimabad after 2009, as union councils were abolished and local government returned to 
an administrative-run system on pre-2001 boundaries, various informal mechanisms grew in strength to fill 
the chasm that dissolution had left.  These demonstrated a complex system of control, drawing partly on 
the domination of political parties, but also on religious leadership, tribal elders, and the strong-arm tactics 
of vigilante groups, which intensified segregation through various forms of informal land control. As 
Yiftachel notes spatial control is an important means of excluding minority groups62. While friction was 
often violent, nevertheless an unofficial balance was retained. The result is a multi-layered system political 
affiliation overlapping with religious, ethnic and tribal loyalties. Street control is exercised by political 
workers, but tribal elders and religious leaders mediate conflict and oversee contract enforcement.  The 
baradary networks of rural Pakistan are thriving in the city. 
Security is an on-going contest between government law-enforcers and vigilante gangs, but steep 
topography means that many areas are beyond the reach of official security control, where petty criminals 
with tribal affiliations can hide from the police, shielded by their community.  Water and electricity supply 
have been co-opted by political and local leadership and government infrastructure funding is syphoned off 
to benefit political parties and elite power groups.  Land control is administered through the erection of 
gates and barriers, control over rental contracts and property purchase, rent-seeking and land invasions. 
The result is an accentuating of religious and ethnic segregation that sharpens the potential for conflict. 
The critical contribution of this case study is a detailed analysis of the way in which large, complex 
urban areas operate when local government fails.  Urban areas do not simply collapse, but leadership is 
established, ‘taxes’ are raised, security operates, urban services function, disputes are regulated, and land 
is traded and exchanged.  The processes through which this informal urban management happens are 
complex, negotiated and contested – sometimes power is exerted through the deliberations of respected 
elders, and sometimes through force or intimidation. Both mechanisms favour those from within the 
‘community’ or ethnic group rather than the wider urban citizenry, although as Gayer suggests 63regulatory 
mechanisms maintain order within visible disorder. 
The most remarkable finding of the study is the gulf between formal and informally developed areas.  
In the formal areas people shun political parties and act to protect their own interests – many residents are 
resourceful and have the education and finance to solve problems without political support, and their 
relative wealth and education gives them some freedom, exercised through the formation of 
neighbourhood committees. In contrast, in the informal areas, although nominally regularised as land title 
has been granted, involvement in both party politics and informal practices of urban management are rife.  
Without functioning local government, there is little transparency in decision-making, taxation or 
urban management.  Local government is not perfect, but its absence in Karachi left little scope to 
challenge the appropriation of assets by force.  As in Brinkerhoff’s analysis of reconstruction64, in Karachi 
the critical challenges include: establishment of an effectively resourced and competent city-wide local 
government; the reconstruction of legitimacy for union government amongst diverse populations with very 
different tribal and religious customs; demilitarising politics and dismantling vigilante gangs by returning 
security to local government officers and to the police, and the effective and equitable delivery of water, 
electricity and other basic services.  There are also positive lessons from studying the institutions that have 
thrived since 2009, suggesting the need to incorporate respected elders and religious leaders into the new 
local administrations, to find employment for young political workers who formerly roamed as gang 
members, and to break the stranglehold of political voting blocks along ethnic lines.  Charismatic 
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